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IN THECOURT OF APPEALSOF OHIO

CUYAHOGA

EIGHTH DISTRICT

COUNTY
NO. 27180

THE STATE OF OHIO,
o

OPINION

-vs-

o

Dated February 10, 1966

JOHN W. TERRY

o

Defendant Appellant

For PlaintiffAppellee:

o

Mr. John T. Corrigan. Prosecuting
Attorney
Mr. Reuben Payne Assistant
ProsecutingAttorney, of Counsel

For DefendantAppellant:

Mr. Louis Stokes
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SYLLABUS

1.

A policemanmay, under appropriate circumstances,

reasonablyinquire of a personconcerninghis suspicious

on-the-streetbehavior. The stopping andquestioningof a
suspiciousperson doesnotviolate the Fourth Amendment
to the UnitedStatesConstitution anddoes not constitute

anarrestinthetechnicalcriminal law sense. A required

element of aarrestisthe intentof the officer to make an

arrest.
2.

Whena detectiveof thirty-nineyearsexperience, after

observingtwo menfor a period of tentotwelve minutes as
they alternatelyand repeatedlyleft the corner on which the

other was stationed, walked several. hundredfeet and peered
intothe windows of eithera

airlineofficeand then

with the

jewelry storeoranadjoining

returned
tothecornerto

converse

other, reasonablysuspects that the menareplanning
these men, identifyhimself

a robbery. he may approach

and inquire
intotheir suspiciousstreet behavior.
3.

Under the circumstances, it isnot unreasonable for a

police-

man. in light of his observations of a person'sactivities
and because of suchperson'sresponseto questioning to

frisk or "patdown" the person in order to protecthimself
froma

possibleassaultwith a dangerousweapon.

People

vs.
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Rivera. 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964) and People vs. Martin,
46 Cal. (2d)106 (1956) followed.
4.

If the

down"

"patting

of a properlydetained personreveals

a gun consealedonhisperson, the illegal possessionof
whichisa felony under
Section2923.01. RevisedCode,
such policeofficerthen,
without
infringementof any
constitutionalguaranteehasadequatereasonable grounds

to

makeaarrest.
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SILBERT C. J.

a verdict o.guilty.

John

w.

Terry and Richard D. Chilton, engaged in behavior, on THE

corner of East14th Street and Euclid Avenue (in
(in downtown

two to five timesby both

men. During

Cleveland).

thisperiod. a thirdman. later

identified as_ Carl Katz approached thecorner, spoke briefly to the
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men and then departed.
After ten to twelve minutes of this behavior. Terry and
Chilton left the corner and proceeded weston Euclid Avenue several

hundredfeet to where they againmet Katz. The three then engaged in

a conversation. As the detective testified:
actions on Huron Road.

* * *. "

andl Isuspected

"*

* *I didn't like their

them of casinga job, a stick-up

Withthis beliefin mind, the detectiveapproached the three men,

identified himself and asked for

theirnames. Receivingonly

a mumbled

response. the detective turnedthe defendant around, quickly "patted
down" the outside of his clothing,

and,perceivinga

hard object in the

inner breast pocketof his topcoat, insertedhis hand and removed a fully
loaded automatic. At this point the detective ordered the three men into

a store, told them to
the wagon.

"

facethe

wall a.nG. yelled to a. store clerk to "call

He then proceededto "patdown" Chilton and upon perceiving

a hardobject inthe lefthand pocket of histopcoat, inserted hishand and

removeda fully loaded revolver. A similar "patting down" of

Katz

revealed nothing. The three menwere then taken to the police station.

where Terryand Chilton were chargedwith

carrying
concealed

Separate trialswere ordered and after a motionto

weapons.

suppresswas

denied,

the defendant Terry was convicted of a. felony under Section 2923. 01.
RevisedCode.

Inthe defendant appellant's brief, the following assignments
OFerror are made:
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l. The Court erredin not sustaining defendant's
Motion to Suppress upon makingits finding that

the arrest herein was illegal.
2.

The Court erred in refusing to apply constitutional

guarantees prohibiting

illegalsearches and

seizures

and substituting therefor a doctrineof stop and frisk.

The fourth amendment to theUnitedStates Constitution pro-

"The rightof the people to be

in their

secure

persons,

houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shallnot be violated. and no

warrants shallissue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the

place to be searchedand the persons OR things to be

This amendment prohibits an

arrest without

Sun vs. United States, 371 U. S. 471

(1962).

"probable cause,"

Wong

and is applied against

the

states throughthe fourteenth amendment. Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 U.

S.

25 (1949).

However, the ambiguous nature ofthe word

and the

"arrest"

issueof the right of the police to stop a person in a public street and

question him under circumstances that would reasonably call for in-...
vestigationand inquiry present complex legal questions in the factual
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contextof this case. Consequently, the initial question. to be resolved
isthe authority of the detective in the circumstances shown hereto

stop and question the defendant. The validityof the subsequent police
actionand the determinationof whether the detectivehad adequate

"reasonablegrounds" to make the arrestwill hinge, in part. on the
propriety of thisinitial inquiry.

Therightof tjeproper authorities to stop and question
persons in suspiciouscircumstanceshasits

roots in

earlyEnglish

practice where it was approved by the courtsand the commonlaw

commentators. See. 2 Hawkins, Pleasof the Crown.
Ed. 1787); 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 89. 96-..

97

122, 129(6th

(Amer. Ed. 1847);

Lawrence vs. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C. P. 1810). Today,
inseveral states, the authority of police officersto detain suspectsfor

a reasonable time forquestioningis grantedby statue. E. g., N. Y.
Code of Crim. Pro. • Sec. 180.A (1965 Supp. h Gen. Laws of R.. 1. , Sec.

12-7-1 (1956); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., Ch. 594, Sec. 2 (1955); 11 Del.
Ann. Code, Sec. 1902 (1953); Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va.
L. Rev. 315 (1942); Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 41, lee. 98(1961) In

others, the rightis recognized bycourtdecisions, E. g.
Rivera, 14 N

o Peoplevs.

Y. (2d)441 (1964); Gisskevs.Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13

(1908): People vs. Martin, 46 Cal.

(2d)106 (l956);

People vs.

Jones,

176Cal. App. (2d), 265 (1959); Peoplevs. Fagenkrantz, 21 Ill. (2d)
75. (1961).
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The United StatesSupremeCourt. however. has never
squarely decided whether the police may constitutionally stop and
questiona suspect without his consentin the absenseof adequate grounds
for arrest. However, the lower federal courts permit such field
interrogations.

See. Henry vs. United States. 361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959)

(Clark, J. dissenting); Brinegar vs.U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 {1949)
(Burton, J. concurring); Keiningham vs. United States, 307 F. (2d) 632

(D. C. Cir. 1962). cert. den. 371 U. S. 948 (1963); Busby vs. United

States, 296 F. (2d)328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962)
The

cases also

indicate that an officermay stop and questioneven though

he has insufficient grounds to make an arrest. See, Ellis vs. United

States. 264 F. (2d) 372 (D.
UnitedStatesvs.

c.

Cir.), cert.

den. 359 U. S. 998 (1959);

Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S. D. N. Y. 1960),

rev'd on other grounds sub nom

U. S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. (2d) 408

(2d Cir. 1960), citedwith approval in U.

s.

vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524,

530 (2d Cir. 1961).

Admittedly there is some division of authority on the legality
of the right to stop and question; however, the better view seems to be
that the stopping and questioning of

suspicious personsis

by the Constitution. See. Note, 50 Cornell L.

not prohibited

Q. 529. 533 (1965);

UnitedStates vs. Vita. 294F. (2d) 524 (2d Cir. 1961) .. cert. den. 369
U. S. 823(1962), Of great persuasive authority do we consider the long

line of California cases, decided under the rule OFPeople vs. Cahan,

APPENDIX F

)

-744 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955) in which this practicehas been upheld

. E.

G.

People vs. Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106 1956); People vs. Simon, 45 Cal.
(2d) 645(1955); People vs. Jones. 176 Cal. App. (2d)

(1959).

Also

of great persuasive authority is the recent New York Court of Appeals
decision in People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964) wherein this

of a person concerninghis suspiciouson-the-street behaviorin the

An individual who acts in a suspicious manner invites a pre ..
liminary inquiry by the properauthority.

Ohio At Large In The Fifty

States.

It does not unreasonably

1962Duke L. J. 319 (1962.). Such a

failed to reveal probable cause, it would thereby forestall invalid
arrests of innocent persons on inadequate causeand the attendant in-

vasion of personal liberty and reputation. if it revealed probable cause,
it would do no more than open the way to a vaiid arrest The business of
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them from taking place whenever it islegally possible. As stated by
the New York Courtof Appeals in the recent case of Peoplevs. Rivera.

"Theauthority of the police to stop defendant a.n.d

* * * Prompt inquiryinto suspiciousor unusual street

function OF city police to be alert to things going wrong

duty would be closed off. "

possibility of some future infraction shouldnot require that the police

piciousbehavior.

If such abuses arise. we shall deal with them when

the time comes. However, for the present, we hold that under the facts

of this case. the detective's inquiry was reasonable under the conditions
presented.

despite a right of inquiry. the

arresttook

place the moment the defendant

was questioned by the detective. According to his argument since the
arrest took. place at the time of the initial

inquiry.

there

was

at that
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evidence mustbe suppressed insupport of this the defendantappellant's
brief states:

interrogate.

the policeofficers in this casedid not conduct

"Since

"

Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 (1964); Commonwealth vs.

Supreme Court appear to have adopted thislatter
vs. United States, 267 U. S.

132, 136(1925);

usage, seeCarroll

Bringegarvs. UnitedStates,

f

(APPENDIX F
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involved: A purpose. to take THE-person into custody

an actual or constructive seizure

or detention

of

APPENDIX

F
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***after they left the corner and you
observedthemagain infront of * * *
(the store where the three men met)

***whatdid you do?
"A.

1 stopped them and went over and talked

"Q.

Then inthissituation you. considered them
to be underarrestwhenyou orderedthe store

people to call for the wagon?
That's right. "

"A.

Thedefendant

appellant,

however.

Henryvs. UnitedStates, 361 U. S. 98

(1959).

contends that the case of
establishes the point that

the arrest in the instant case took placethe moment the
stopped by the detective.

defendant
was

However, in theHenry case, the government

conceded in the lower courts. see 259F. (2d)725 (7th Cir. 1958), and

adhered to the

concession before theSupreme Court, that

the "arrest"

occurred the moment the car inwhich Henry was riding was stopped
by the federal agents. The Supreme Courtin its opinion stated:
"The

prosecutionconcededbelow. and adheres to

that concession

here, that

when the federalagents

the arresttook place

stoppedthe

car. Thisis
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our riew of the facts of this particular case.
361u.

s.

"

at103.

When the opinionin Henryis read in light of this concession,
it is apparentthat the court was only deciding that, in the circumstances

of that case. there wasno probable

cause to justify an "arrest"at the

time the carinwhich Henry was riding was stopped. See, United States

vs.

Bonanno,supra at

p. 85; Busbyvs. UnitedStates, supra.

There-

fore, we hold that. in the instant case. the actual arrest did not occur

untilthe defendant

was

orderedinto the storeafterthe loaded gun was

discovered concealed on his

U. s.

person; Cf.

Riosvs. United States, 364

253 (1960).
Having determinedthat the police officer could validly inquire

into the activities of the defendant. then it follows that the officer ought

to be allowed to frisk. under some circumstances at least, to insure
that the suspectdoes notpossess a dangerous weapon which would put the

safety of the officer

inperil. See, Remington, The

Law Relating to

"onThe Street"Detention, Questioning and FriskingofSuspected
Persons and Police Arrest Privilegesin General, 51 J. Crim. L.
C. & P. S. 386, 391(1960).
Are

What is the officer to do

.

inthissituation?

we to allow him the right of inquiry and then, when this right is

exercised, rewardhim with an assailant's bullet? The practice of
friskingiswell accepted in police practice and policeofficers seem
unanimous
in statingthatfriskingis donefor self-protectionandnot

as
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-13a mere evidentiary fishing expedition. See, Note, Philadelphia Police

Practice and The Law of Arrest, 100

U. Pa.

L. Rev. 1182 (l952);

Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and TheLaw of Arrest, 54 J. Crim.
L.,

c.

& P. S. 393(1963). The UniformArrestAct and the state

statutes which providefor questioningofsuspicious persons specifically
allow forthefrisking of a suspect.

See, Warner,

The Uniform Arrest

Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942); Gen. Laws of R. I., Sec. 12- 7 -2

(1954): N. H. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Sec. 1903 (1953);

Ann.,
Ch. 594.
N.

Y.

Sec. 3 (1955); 11 Del. Code

Code
Crim. Pro.,Sec.

In other states the right isrecognizedby

180a (1965 Supp.).

courtdecision.

See, People

vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964); People vs.Martin 46 Cal. (2d)
106 (1956); People vs.Simon. 45 Cal. (2d) 645 (1955) People vs. Jones,.

176 Cal. App. (2d) 265(1959).
In the instantcase thisofficer, of thirty-nineyears EXPERIENCE,

reasonably suspectedthat thedefendant was "casing"a storewith
robbery in mind. It was

also logicalfor this EXPERIENCED
detective

presumethat the defendant

wasarmed and dangerous

Asstated in

the record:

"Q.

Detective

McFadden, can

you tell

us

whyyou

turnedJohnTerryaroundfacingthe othertwomen,

to

APPENDIX
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-

to pull a stick-up and the
they may have a

gun.

However, we must becareful to distinguish that

only a

authorized herein includes
no means authorizes

anything
else

a

dangerousweapon.

It by

a searchfor contraband, evidentiarymaterial,

or

in theabsence of reasonablegrounds to arrest. Such a

search is controlled by the

requirementsof

probable cause is essential.

(D. C. Cir. 1959).
the instant

friskfor

thefrisk

White vs. United States, 271 F. (2d) 829

Therefore.

case,the

the fourth amendmentand

we hold only that

in

ON thefacts

friskfor dangerousweapons was valid as anincident

to a valid inquiry by the police. Eachcasemust be
decideduponits own

facts.
Asa result of the valid frisk, a fully loaded automatic was

discoveredconcealed on theperson of the
possession of this weapon i" a f@l@ny
C~.

According to the

defendants.The unauthorized

i11~r

.$ectiom. 2923. 01,, Rtnri.1Jed

uacont~cted ~vid.e~ce

wu not arrested until after he

was

bl thit11

CU®~

th@

orderedinto the store. At the

def@i'tnd3.~
moment

of the arrest, thedetective had reasonablegrounds to believe a felony

was beingcommitted. As

"Whether an

statedin

Beckvs. Ohio 379U. S. 89(1964):

arrestisconstitutionallyvalid depends

upon whether at the momentthe arrest is made

the

officers had probable cause to make it - whetherat

that

moment,the

facts and circumstances

within

their knowledgeof which they ha reasonablytrustworthy

;-
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)

-15information were sufficient to warranta prudent
man in believing the petitioners had committed or

were committing an offense.
Therefore,

we

"

hold that, as the detective had validly found

the gun. he hadat the moment of the arrest adequate probablecause

to arrestthe

defendant,

Busbyvs. UnitedStates. supra, and that the

arrest in no way violated the fourth

amendment.

One furtherpointremainsto be discussed concerning

defendantappellant's contention that thearrestoccurredat the time
of the initialquestioning and thereforeunder the
Mapp

eXclusionaryruleof

vs. Ohio. 367 U. S. 643(1961), theevidencemust be

Although we haveheldthat the

arrestinthis

suppressed.

casedid not takeplace

until the defendant was ordered into the store, we mustnote

that even if the arresttook place as appellant contends, it

necessarily follow that this evidence

mustbe

inpassing

doesnot

suppressed.

The Mapp exclusionaryrulewas imposedupon the states not

because of some

command
inherent in the

fourthamendment but rather

becausethe Supreme Court believed thatit
could be forcedto

respect the

fourth

obtain a conviction usingevidence

was the

amendment.

only way the police
lf the police could not

unlawfullyobtained.

no incentive to conduct illegal searches. if we

keepin

they

wouldhave

mind this

raisond'etre of the exclusionary rule, we can guardagainstconfusion
in the attendant rulesthat aredeveloped. A judicial rule

rendering
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evidence produced as the resultof a frisk inadmissiblewould failto
deter the police fromfrisking
suspects believed to be armedas police
friskfor their own protection rather thanfor the purpose of looking for
evidence. A rule of inadmissibilityinsuchcases could only
allowing
the

resultin

armedcriminal to go freealthough failingto any

extent to protect individualliberty. The

meaningful

ruleof illegally

eXclusionary

obtained
evidence cannot
be interpretedsoley to providea

hunting"theory of criminaljustice. The purpose of the

tidy "foX

eXclusionaryrule

IS to control policemisconductandinthis conteXTitit must be applied.

Traynor, Mapp vs.Ohio At LargeIn The Fifty
319 (1962); Note,50 CornellL. Q. 529(1965).

Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court

wouldhold

that

federalofficers may notinquireinto suspicious street activitiesor frisk
inthe absence of probable cause to arrest, this doesnotnecessarily

invalidatethe applicable state rules. There isno mandate inthe
opinionthat the states henceforth mustabide by all the interpretations

of thefederal courts. Traynor, Mapp vs. OhioAt Large In The Fifty

States, supra, at 320. Local problemsof law
different from

federalproblems,

andthe

enforcementare quite

rangeof

crimesencompassed

by the states' jurisdiction creates morecomplicatedpatterns to be

dealt with.

Thestates

arenotprecluded from developing"workable

rules"governing arrest, searches and seizuresto meetthe
demands of effective criminal investigationandlaw

practical

enforcement
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providedtheserulesdo notviolatetheconstitutionalproscriptions againstains t.

unreasonable
searches

the
concomitant command
that
evidence

seizedisinadmissibleagainstonewho
has

standing
to complain.Ker

374U. S. 23 (1963);Beckvs. Ohio,
379U. S. 89

vs. California

(1964). Thenecessitieso. lawenforcementinlarge
urban
areasrequire
the proceduresutilizedintheinstantcase. We agree with the
District
ofColumbia
CourtofAppeals
whentheystatedthattheycannot
believe

thatthe"Supreme
Courthasforbidden
policeto

vs.

Trilling

United States

260F.

investigatecrime."

(2D)677, 700. (D. c.

Cir. 1958).

For the reasons statedherein, thejudgmentoftheCommon

PleasCourtls affirmed.
EXceptions. Order see journal

ARTL, J. AND
CORRIGAN, J.
J. CONCUR.

